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The Political Economy of Imperialism,
Decolonization and Development
ERIK GARTZKE AND DOMINIC ROHNER*
Nations have historically sought power and prosperity through control of physical space. In recent
decades, however, this has largely ceased. Most states that could do so appear relucant, while the
weak cannot expand. This article presents a theory of imperialism and decolonization that explains
both historic cycles of expansion and decline and the collective demise of the urge to colonize.
Technological shocks enable expansion, while rising labour costs and the dynamics of military
technology gradually dilute imperial advantage. Simultaneously, economic development leads to a
secular decline in payoffs for appropriating land, minerals and capital. Once conquest no longer pays
great powers, the systemic imperative to integrate production vertically also becomes archaic.
‘Other nations in history have fought in foreign lands and remained to occupy and exploit.
Americans, following a battle, want nothing more than to return homey’
George W. Bush
Two recent American wars in the Middle East have reawakened discussions of American
Empire.1 In contrast to traditional patterns, however, the United States appears to have
no desire to acquire more territory. Whether empire requires physical expansion and
colonization, or simply ‘effective control’ of another society,2 seems to us to be largely
deﬁnitional.3 Labelling American motives and practices as imperial, hegemonic or
something else is perhaps less critical than attempting to understand why such behaviour
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Science Society (International) in Columbus, Ohio, 2006. Dominic Rohner gratefully acknowledges
ﬁnancial support from the Swiss National Science Foundation (SNF grant no. 100014-122636). All data
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1 Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Owl
Books, 2001); Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire: Militarism, Secrecy, and the End of the Republic
(New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004); Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and
Consequences of US Diplomacy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002); Niall Ferguson,
Colossus: The Price of America’s Empire (New York: Penguin, 2004).
2 Michael W. Doyle, Empires (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1986), p. 30.
3 Niall Ferguson prefers the term ‘empire’ to ‘hegemony’. ‘To compare . . . the United States and the
United Kingdom as hegemonies is to miss differences that become obvious when the two are compared as
empires.’ Distinguishing between US hegemony and British empire would highlight the differences
Ferguson seeks to emphasize: ‘A century ago, the United Kingdom’s formal empire was very large indeed,
covering nearly a quarter of the world’s surface and ruling roughly the same proportion of its population.
Today, on the other hand, the United States’ formal empire includes just 14 dependencies (of which the
largest is Puerto Rico) and covers less than 11,000 square kilometers.’ (Niall Ferguson, ‘Hegemony or
Empire? Book Review’, Foreign Affairs, 82 (2003), pp. 160–1.)
exists and evolves over time.4 We seek to explain the acquisition or abandonment of
colonial holdings, offering an account that ties together the rise and fall of territorial
expansion with the current American penchant for inﬂuence rather than long-term
occupation. Developed nations exhibit little of the traditional preoccupation with
obtaining land and resources through force. The appeal of colonial holdings evaporated
for leading nations by the mid-twentieth century. Rather than reﬂecting an exception to
traditional tendencies, American efforts represent secular change in the imperatives of
power; owning land or minerals matters much less than guiding the global commons.
One of the deﬁning characteristics of the modern world has been the cycle of the
European empire. In it, the familiar pattern of expansion and contraction is readily
discernible.5 Yet while acts viewed as ‘imperialist’ may persist today, no nation or set of
nations has come forward to pick up the gauntlet of empire. The world’s richest and most
powerful countries show little interest in the continuous administration of foreign
territory, as opposed to attempting to inﬂuence, intimidate or coerce foreign sovereigns
and polities. These same powers are also vigorously opposed to allowing other countries
to pursue any territorial ambitions. What some have labelled a norm of territorial
integrity seems to us to require further explanation.6 What motivates an end of empire?
Can we expect this phenomenon to continue or will the future return to historical patterns
of imperial growth and decay? The notion of American Exceptionalism implies that other,
less ‘exceptional’ nations will someday resurrect these more traditional patterns. China or
India, for example, might use growing economic and military potential to expand at the
expense of their neighbours. Alternatively, rising powers may ﬁnd that control of physical
space is best accomplished by proxy, ensuring that other countries accommodate Beijing
or Delhi, rather than by actually having to conquer, and administer, marginally
productive places that are geographically distant from the metropolis.
We offer a theory of imperialism and decolonization based on the dynamics of systemic
structure, military technology and economic development. Random capability shocks
create military advantages that gradually decay as insights fade or equipment becomes
outdated or as accumulating capital forces a change in the logic of military organization that
dilutes initial military advantages. Military capability shocks by themselves can explain the
cycle of empire, but not the secular trend away from territorial expansion. A second feature,
economic development, has led nations gradually to prefer commerce to conquest. Capital
abundance makes empire expensive, shifting incentives away from appropriating inputs to
production and towards efforts to inﬂuence the terms under which nations interact. A third
element explains the timing and rapidity of decolonization. Conquest imparts political
control that invites the vertical integration of economic processes. Mercantilism in turn
impels other countries to acquire or maintain colonies in order to access markets and inputs
to production. This imperialist prisoner’s dilemma is reversed once inﬂuential actors prefer
free market policies, allowing other countries to abandon empire as well. The theory predicts
4 President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela recently claimed in the United Nations that the United States
was led by ‘the devil’.
5 See, for example, Edward Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (New York: Knopf,
1993[1776]); Oswald Spengler, The Decline of the West (London: Allen & Unwin, 1932); George A.
Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987).
6 Mark Zacher, ‘The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force’,
International Organization, 55 (2001), 215–50; Tanisha Fazal, State Death: The Politics and Geography of
Conquest, Occupation, and Annexation (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2007).
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that territorial empire is archaic. Power in the modern world derives from productivity
rather than from raw materials. The lust for land could return, however, if inputs again
become scarce, if military technology lowers occupation costs, or if powerful nations fail to
perpetuate and abet open markets.
LITERATURE: TROPES OF EMPIRE
Lasting over three and a half centuries, the age of imperialism profoundly shaped the
modern world. The classical practice of territorial expansion virtually ended soon after the
Second World War, but the institutions and economies of the often contrived successor
nations formed to manage abandoned colonial holdings remain heavily conditioned by
their dependency.7 Territorial imperialism has been widely criticized both during8 and after
its formal practice.9 Considerable attention also focused on the consequences of
decolonization.10 Yet, while many scholars examine the origins of empire,11 its practice12
or demise,13 less effort has been devoted to relating historical cycles of expansion and decay
to the secular, and precipitous, terminus of territorial empire in the mid-twentieth century.14
7 See, for example, Douglass North, Structure and Change in Economic History (New York: Norton,
1981); Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson, ‘The Colonial Origins of Comparative
Development: An Empirical Investigation’, American Economic Review, 91 (2001), 1369–1401; Hendrik
Spruyt, Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 2005).
8 John A. Hobson, Imperialism (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1938 [1905]); V. I. Lenin,
Imperialism: The Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York: International Publishers, 1970 [1916]); George
Orwell, Shooting an Elephant and Other Essays (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1950); Jean-Paul
Sartre, Colonialism and Neocolonialism (London: Routledge, 2001).
9 Edward W. Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York: Knopf, 1993); Edward W. Said, Orientalism
(New York: Vintage Books, 1994); Edward W. Said, ‘Yeats and Decolonization’, in Moustafa Bayoumi
and Andrew Rubin, eds, The Edward Said Reader (New York: Vintage Books, 2000); Noam Chomsky,
Hegemony or Survival: America’s Quest for Global Dominance (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2003);
Johnson, Blowback; and Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire.
10 John Darwin, Britain and Decolonization: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World (New
York: St. Martin’s, 1988); Raymond F. Betts, Decolonization (London: Routledge, 1998).
11 Tony Smith, The Pattern of Imperialism: The United States, Great Britain, and the Late-
Industrializing World since 1815 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981); Geoffrey Scammell,
The First Imperial Age: European Overseas Expansion c. 1400–1715 (Boston, Mass.: Unwin-Hyman,
1989); Nicholas Canny, ed., The Oxford History of the British Empire: Vol. I: The Origins of Empire:
British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century (New York: Oxford University Press,
2001); Jeremy Black, Europe and the World, 1650–1830 (New York: Routledge, 2002).
12 Heinz Gollwitzer, Europe in the Age of Imperialism, 1880–1914 (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co.,
1969); Peter J. Cain and Anthony G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688–1914
(London: Longman, 1993).
13 Alexander Motyl, Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse and Revival of Empires (New York: Columbia
University Press, 2001); Johan Galtung, Tore Heiestad and Erik Rudeng, ‘On the Decline and Fall of
Empires: The Roman Empire & Western Imperialism Compared’, Review (Fernand Braudel Center), 4
(1980), 91–153; Johan Galtung, The Decline and Fall of Empires: A Theory of Re-Development (Geneva:
Research Institute on Development (UNRISD), 1996); John Springhall, Decolonization Since 1945: The
Collapse of European Empires Overseas (New York: Palgrave, 2001).
14 Our argument is by no means incompatible with the view that moral suasion helped to end empire.
See, for example, Robert Jackson, ‘The Weight of Ideas in Decolonization: Normative Change in
International Relations’, in Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds, Ideas and Foreign Policy:
Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 111–38; Neta
Crawford, Argument and Change in World Politics: Ethics, Decolonization, and Humanitarian Intervention
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Explorations of contemporary imperialism seem more rhetorical and didactic than
deductive or analytical.15 Discussion of American empire has ebbed and ﬂowed with
shifting American power,16 and with a variable landscape of international actors.17
Careful research has focused on an evolving logic of hierarchy,18 or on the role of
American hegemony in deterring territorial aggression.19 Absent is an account of why, in
fact, things are not more like they used to be.
Explanations for Imperialism
Explanations for empire focus on the demand of the metropolis for riches, resources, markets
or jobs; on the supply of targets for conquest; or on system-level factors that condition
colonial opportunities or demand.20 Hobson, Lenin and others claimed that the imperial
impetus comes from over-extended capitalism.21 Snyder views instead political and military
elites as the cause of empire, while jingoistic propaganda deceives the masses.22 Dependency
theorists shift the emphasis to political tensions and economic incentives on the periphery.23
(F’note continued)
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Yet to use such arguments runs the risk of being overly
congratulatory about the triumph of Western ethics over Western avarice. Western civilization set aside
ethical qualms for hundreds of years. The very dawn of empire is punctuated by acts like the encomiendo
that nominally guaranteed Church protection in the New World, but which effectively gave authorities a
free hand with indigenous populations.
15 Johnson, Blowback; Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire; Ferguson, Colossus.
16 Arthur Schlesinger Jr, The Cycles of American History (Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifﬁn, 1986); Paul
Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change &Military Conﬂict from 1500 to 2000 (New
York: Random House, 1989).
17 Andrew J. Bacevich, American Empire: The Realities and Consequences of US Diplomacy
(Cambridge, Mass.: University of Harvard Press, 2002).
18 David Lake, ‘Anarchy, Hierarchy, and the Variety of International Institutions’, International
Organization, 50 (1996), 1–33; Alexander Cooley, Logics of Hierarchy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University
Press, 2005).
19 Zacher, ‘The Territorial Integrity Norm’; Fazal, State Death.
20 Our comments on the literature are necessarily brief. They are not intended as a thorough or
balanced representation of available perspectives. Instead, we focus on contemporary debates and our
own view of salient controversies.
21 Hobson, Imperialism; Lenin, Imperialism. For reviews and criticism, see David K. Fieldhouse,
‘ ‘‘Imperialism’’: An Historiographical Revision’, Economic History Review, 14 (1961), 187–209; David K.
Fieldhouse, The Theory of Capitalist Imperialism (London: Longman, 1967); Rajan Menon and John R.
Oneal, ‘Explaining Imperialism: The State of the Art in Three Theories’, Polity, 19 (1986), 169–93; A. M.
Eckstein, ‘Is There a ‘‘Hobson–Lenin Thesis’’ on Late Nineteenth-Century Colonial Expansion?’
Economic History Review, 44 (1991), 297–318; Patrick Wolfe, ‘History and Imperialism: A Century of
Theory, from Marx to Postcolonialism’, American History Review, 102 (1997), 388–420.
22 Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1991).
23 John Gallagher and Ronald Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’, Economic History Review, 6
(1953), 1–15; Theotonio Dos Santos, ‘The Structure of Dependence’, American Economic Review, 60
(1970), 231–6; Johan Galtung, ‘A Structural Theory of Imperialism’, Journal of Peace Research, 8 (1971),
81–117; James A. Caporaso, ‘Dependence, Dependency, and Power in the Global System: A Structural
and Behavioral Analysis’, International Organization, 32 (1998), 14–43. For criticism, see Elisabeth
Gidengil, ‘Centres and Peripheries: An Empirical Test of Galtung’s Theory of Imperialism’, Journal of
Peace Research, 15 (1978), 51–66; Tony Smith, ‘The Underdevelopment of Development Literature: The
Case of Dependency Theory’, World Politics, 31 (1979), 247–88; Erich Weede and Horst Tiefenbach,
‘Some Recent Explanations of Income Inequality: An Evaluation & Critique’, International Studies
Quarterly, 25 (1981), 255–82.
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Agents co-opted by the metropolis undermine developing nations. A third category of
argument involves structural theories from realists,24 to Marxist historians like Wallerstein,25
to long-cycle theorists.26 Empires expand or contract in an organic fashion, responding in an
unending cycle of world power or prosperity.
Explanations for Decolonization
Scholarship on the end of empire can be grouped by supply-side, demand-side and system-
structural approaches. Some researchers emphasize domestic politics in the metropolis.27 The
need of landed nobles to provide employment for ‘second sons’ may have dissipated with the
rise of other more fungible forms of property. Alternately, democracy itself may have shifted
the domestic political calculus. A second perspective emphasizes colonial resistance and/or
the decline of the European educated ‘comprador’ class of native elites.28 Finally, other
researchers favour international factors, such as the ‘demonstration effect’ of initial Japanese
victories over the Western colonial powers in the Second World War, or the rise of an anti-
imperialist bipolar system during the Cold War.29
Putting Together Growth and Decay
Students of world affairs have long been interested in the rise and fall of great powers.30
The ‘world-economy’ approach has been particularly inﬂuential in conjunction with the
24 Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Robert
Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
25 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979).
26 Modelski, Long Cycles in World Politics; George Modelski and William R. Thompson, Seapower in
Global Politics, 1494–1993 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1988); Joshua S. Goldstein, Long
Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1988); William
R. Thompson, On Global War: Historical-Structural Approaches to World Politics (Columbia: University
of South Carolina Press, 1988); Christopher Chase-Dunn and Richard Rubinson, ‘Toward a Structural
Perspective on the World-System’, Politics and Society, 7 (1979), 453–76; Christopher Chase-Dunn,
Yukio Kawano and Benjamin Bewer, ‘Trade Globalization Since 1795: Waves of Integration in the
World-System’, American Sociological Review, 65 (2000), 77–95. For an effort to tie together long-cycle
theory with theories of imperial growth and decline, see Brian M. Pollins and Kevin P. Murrin, ‘Where
Hobbes Meets Hobson: Core Conﬂict and Colonialism, 1495–1985’, International Studies Quarterly, 43
(1999), 427–54. For a review of long-cycles research, see Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, ‘Global
War and the Political Economy of Structural Change’, in Manus I. Midlarsky, ed., The Handbook of War
Studies (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), pp. 301–33. For criticism, see Nathaniel Beck,
‘The Illusion of Cycles in International Relations’, International Studies Quarterly, 35 (1991), 455–76; and
Gerald Silverberg, ‘Long Waves in Global Warfare and Maritime Hegemony? A Complex Systems
Perspective’, in Tessaleno C. Devezas, ed., Kondratieff Waves, Warfare and World Security (Amsterdam:
IOS Press, 2006), pp. 154–64.
27 Miles Kahler, Decolonization in Britain and France: The Domestic Consequences of International
Relations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984); Roy Holland, European Decolonization,
1918–1981: An Introductory Survey (New York: St. Martin’s, 1985).
28 Stuart C. Easton, The Rise and Fall of Western Colonialism (New York: Praeger, 1964); Henri
Grimal, Decolonization: The British, French, Dutch and Belgian Empires (London: Routledge, 1978); D. A.
Low, Eclipse of Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
29 David McIntyre, Commonwealth of Nations: Origins and Impact (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1977); Brian Lapping, End of Empire (London: Granada, 1985).
30 See Gibbon, The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire; A. T. Mahan, The Inﬂuence of Sea Power on
History, 1660–1783, 5th edn (New York: Dover, 1987 [1890]); John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great
Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2001).
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dependency theory.31 Inequality varies between core and periphery.32 Economic
stagnation leads to imperial conquest, while booms reduce interest in colonial holdings.
The world-economy model thus pays more attention to long economic cycles than to the
variable costs of colonial occupation.
Economic determinists stress that imperialism is the inevitable product of capitalist
expansion.33 Changes in the economies of capitalist countries forced Western powers to
seek dependencies that continue today in the post-colonial periphery.34 However, Marxist
thinkers in particular are less interested in explicating the forces driving divestment of
colonial holdings.
Institutionalism emphasizes political and social factors as the leading determinants of
imperial growth and decay.35 Empire and decolonization result from shifting power
relations among beneﬁciaries and those hurt by colonialism.36 Competition is intensiﬁed
by political liberalization in the metropolis,37 or by metropolitan cultural traditions.38
Yet institutionalists face a heavy burden in explaining the persistent impotence of
anti-colonialist ideas, as well as their sudden salience. Rapid decolonization, in a context
of dramatic economic change, suggests the value of economic incentives in bolstering
institutionalist arguments. Indeed, as the other two approaches make clear, many view
the colonial enterprise as fundamentally economic, even as other factors play signiﬁcant
roles.
31 Dos Santos, The Structure of Dependence; Andre Gunder Frank, ‘The Development of
Underdevelopment’, Monthly Review, 18 September 1966.
32 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the
European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (New York: Academic Press, 1974); Immanuel
Wallerstein, ‘The Three Instances of Hegemony in the History of the Capitalist World-Economy’,
International Journal of Comparative Sociology, 24 (1983), 100–8; Galtung, ‘A Structural Theory of
Imperialism’; Gidengil, ‘Centres and Peripheries’; Chase-Dunn and Rubinson, ‘Toward a Structural
Perspective on the World-System’; Patrick McGowan and Bohdan Kordan, ‘Imperialism in World-
System Perspective: Britain 1870–1914’, International Studies Quarterly, 25 (1981), 43–68; Karen Rasler
and William R. Thompson, ‘Global Wars, Public Debts, and the Long Cycle’, World Politics, 35 (1983),
489–516.
33 Karl Marx, ‘The East India Company: Its History and Results’, in Karl Marx, Fredrick Engels:
Collected Works (New York: International Publishers, 1975 [1853]), pp. 148–56; Hobson, Imperialism;
Lenin, Imperialism.
34 Gallagher and Robinson, ‘The Imperialism of Free Trade’; Henry Magdoff, The Age of Imperialism:
The Economics of U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1969); Theodore H. Moran,
‘Multinational Corporations and Dependency: A Dialogue for Dependentistas and Non-Dependentistas’,
International Organization, 32 (1978), 79–100.
35 David Strang, ‘From Dependency to Sovereignty: An Event History Analysis of Decolonization
1870–1987’, American Sociological Review, 55 (1990), 846–60; David Strang, ‘Anomaly and
Commonplace in European Political Expansion: Realist and Institutional Accounts’, International
Organization, 45 (1991), 143–62.
36 See, for example, Benjamin J. Cohen, The Question of Imperialism: The Political Economy of
Dominance and Dependence (New York: Basic Books, 1973); Miles Kahler, ‘Political Regime and
Economic Actors: The Response of Firms to the End of Colonial Rule’, World Politics, 33 (1981),
383–412; Mitsuhiko Kimura, ‘The Economics of Japanese Imperialism in Korea, 1910–1939’, Economic
History Review, 48 (1995), 555–74; Nuno R. Garoupa and Joa˜o E. Gata, ‘War and Peace: The European
Decolonization Process’ (Working Paper, Department of Economics at the School of Economics and
Management, Technical University of Lisbon, 2001).
37 Miles Kahler, ‘External Ambition and Economic Performance’, World Politics, 40 (1988), 419–51.
38 Anthony Pagden, Lords of All the World: Ideologies of Empire in Spain, Britain and France,
1500–1800 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995); David Armitage, The Ideological Origins of
the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).
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Only a few studies attempt to explore intensively the micro-foundations for colonial
expansion and decline. According to Grossman and Iyigun, investments in colonies
could be proﬁtable due to monopoly rents, provided that the risk of insurrection is
low.39 Increasing the insurrection technology or size of local populations could make
colonization unproﬁtable, eventually triggering an abandonment of empire.40 These
studies rely on largely exogenous changes in the colony to explain the end of empire.
Nationalism or insurgency could make colonialism more expensive.41 But these same
challenges confront domestic sovereigns who nevertheless strive to retain power. It seems
unlikely that these changes alone explain the rapid and widespread divestment of colonial
holdings. The question of why modernity has trended away from empire remains to be
explained.
TERRITORY ‘AIN’T WHAT IT USED TO BE’: CYCLES AND TRENDS
We offer a theory combining the ﬂow, ebb, persistence and demise of territorial empire that
focuses on three factors. First, exogenous military capability shocks create the opportunity to
reallocate territory through colonization.42 Secondly, occupation encourages mercantilist
economic policies, in turn increasing incentives for other nations to acquire colonies. Finally,
development produces a secular decline in the value of colonial holdings, while making
occupation less efﬁcient. Other inﬂuences on empire, including democratization in the
metropolis, and nationalist sentiments and resistance movements in the colony, are explored
in the modelling section and in two appendices.43
39 Herschel Grossman and Murat Iyigun, ‘The Proﬁtability of Colonial Investment’, Economics and
Politics, 7 (1995), 229–41. For a debate on ‘gentlemanly capitalism’, see Peter J. Cain and Anthony G.
Hopkins, ‘The Political Economy of British Expansion Overseas, 1750–1914’, Economic History Review,
33 (1980), 463–90; Peter J. Cain and Anthony G. Hopkins, ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism and British
Expansion Overseas I: The Old Colonial System, 1688–1850’, Economic History Review, 39 (1986),
501–25; Patrick O’Brien, ‘Imperialism and the Rise and Decline of the British Economy, 1688–1989’, New
Left Review, 1, No. 238 (1999), 48–80; Patrick O’Brien, ‘Mercantilism and Imperialism in the Rise and
Decline of the Dutch and British Economies’, De Economist, 148 (2000), 469–501; Nicholas J. White, ‘The
Business and the Politics of Decolonization: The British Experience in the Twentieth Century’, Economic
History Review, 53 (2000), 544–64.
40 Herschel Grossman and Murat Iyigun, ‘Population Increase and the End of Colonialism’,
Economica, 64 (1997), 483–93. For a claim that colonial investments were proﬁtable, see John R.
Oneal and Frances H. Oneal, ‘Hegemony, Imperialism, and the Proﬁtability of Foreign Investments’,
International Organization, 42 (1988), 347–73. For an argument that investment and colonial control were
interrelated, see Jeffry A. Frieden, ‘International Investment and Colonial Control: A New
Interpretation’, International Organization, 48 (1994), 559–93. Capital ﬂowed to middle-income
countries, rather than to colonies. See Michael A. Clemens and Jeffrey G. Williamson, ‘Where Did
British Foreign Capital Go?’ (Cambridge, Mass.: NBER Working Paper 8028, 2000), and also Sidney
Pollard, ‘Capital Exports, 1870–1914: Harmful or Beneﬁcial?’ Economic History Review, 2nd ser. 38
(1985), 489–514; Sidney Pollard, ‘Comment on Peter Temin’s Comment’, Economic History Review, 2nd
ser. 40 (1987), 452–8; Peter Temin, ‘Capital Exports, 1870–1914: An Alternative Model’, Economic
History Review, 2nd ser. 40 (1987), 453–8; V. N. Balasubramanyam, ‘Capital Exports, 1870–1914’,
Economic History Review, 42 (1989), 260–4.
41 Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1983); James D.
Fearon and David D. Laitin, ‘Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War’, American Political Science Review,
97 (2003), 75–90.
42 Military advantage can lead to other forms of hierarchy, such as vassal states, which we do not
explore here.
43 All appendices are available online at: http://www.journals.cambridge.org/jps.
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Military Effectiveness: The Onset and Diffusion of Shock and Awe
Anecdote and logic suggest that the advent of empire is closely tied to the ability and incentive
to project power.44 Empire generally begins with new military, economic, transportation or
logistical technology that suddenly allows one country to conquer and control other states or
territories.45 Capability shocks are thus a necessary, but not sufﬁcient, condition for imperial
expansion. Conversely, military and other advantages borne of technological innovation
diffuse over time. Targets of empire have incentives to adapt, absorbing technologies and
limiting or eliminating advantages of the imperial power.46 Unless the imperial power
continues to innovate, it eventually declines.47 As one British historian describes the situation,
‘we had a comparative advantage as an island seapower. It was then enlarged and sustained
because we secured the further comparative advantage of being the world’s ﬁrst industrial
nation. These advantages ﬁrst shrank and then disappeared.’48
European expansion and colonization took place in the context of dramatic increases
in the administrative, transportation and military capabilities of European states.49
44 J. F. C. Fuller, Armament and History: A Study of the Inﬂuence of Armament on History from the
Dawn of Classical Warfare to the Second World War (London: Scribner, 1945); William H. McNeill, The
Rise of the West: A History of the Human Community (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963);
William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and Society Since A.D. 1000
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984); William H. McNeill, ‘World History and the Rise and Fall
of the West’, Journal of World History, 9 (1998), 215–36; Martin van Creveld, Technology and War: From
2000 B.C. to the Present (New York: The Free Press, 1989); Trevor N. Dupuy, The Evolution of Weapons
and Warfare (Cambridge, Mass.: Da Capo Press, 1990).
45 Daniel R. Headrick, The Tools of Empire: Technology and European Imperialism in the Nineteenth
Century (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981). It is easy to overemphasize technology, or confuse
power projection with combat effectiveness. Leadership and personnel also remain important. See Trevor
N. Dupuy, Numbers, Predictions and War: Using History to Evaluate Combat Factors and Predict the
Outcome of Battles (Fairfax, Va.: Hero Books, 1979); Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray and Kenneth
H. Watman, ‘The Effectiveness of Military Organizations’, International Security, 11 (1986), 37–71; Allan
Stam and Dan Reiter, ‘Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory’, American Political Science Review, 92
(1998), 377–89; Allan Stam and Dan Reiter, ‘Democracy and Battleﬁeld Military Effectiveness’, Journal
of Conﬂict Resolution, 42 (1998), 259–77; Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, Democracies At War (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002); Ralph Rotte and Christoph M. Schmidt, ‘On the Production of
Victory: Empirical Determinants of Battleﬁeld Success in Modern War’, Defense and Peace Economics, 14
(2003), 175–92; Stephen Biddle, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004); Kier A. Lieber, War and the Engineers: The Primacy
of Politics over Technology (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2005).
46 Barry Buzan and Eric Herring, The Arms Dynamic in World Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner,
1998); Keith Krause, Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1992); Emily O. Goldman and Richard Andres, ‘Systemic Effects of Military Innovation and
Diffusion’, Security Studies, 8 (1999), 79–125; Emily O. Goldman and Leslie C. Eliason, eds, Diffusion of
Military Technology and Ideas (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2003). Colonizers and local
populations engage in a strategic game: ‘The logic of Western superiority in ﬁxed encounters had been
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This transformation and its consequences for European politics are discussed elsewhere.50
Accounts of the origins of these dramatic increases in capabilities vary. Some authors
argue that harsh competition pushed European powers to develop more powerful arms
and armies.51 Others emphasize ﬁnancial innovations which permitted powerful
militaries, and particularly navies.52 Still other research identiﬁes a symbiosis in which
states promoted a European state system, which in turn privileged states as actors.53 For
our purposes, identifying the origins of these innovations is less pertinent than explaining
why waves of technological and administrative change propelled adventurers, then
armies, to distant places and why this impetus later ebbed and evaporated, and has not
returned.54
The cyclical nature of empire,55 and of military advantage,56 are well established, if
somewhat stylized, empirical facts. What is less well understood is whether there exists
variation in the motivation for empire. Some scholars argue that the urge to conquer is
ubiquitous, occurring in all nations at all times and held in check only by the lack of
technological advantage or martial expertise, or alternatively by mutual deterrence.57
Alternately, one can conceive of the impetus to empire as particularistic, housed in the
aspirations of individual leaders, and thus more stuff of historical and biographical
research than of social science. We view the preference for territorial aggression as a
variable driven by environmental conditions that can recur or trend over time.
A second aspect of military innovation involves specialization. Armies can be used to ﬁght
and win wars against other armies, or to control the populations and territories of subject
(F’note continued)
State’, Journal of Economic History, 33 (1973), 203–21; Frank Tallett, War and Society in Early Modern
Europe, 1495–1715 (London: Routledge, 1997); David B. Abernethy, The Dynamics of Global Dominance:
European Overseas Empires, 1415–1980 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002).
50 See, for example, Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System II: Mercantilism and the
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51 See, for example, Brian Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change (Princeton, N.J.:
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places. Winning at war involves massing military power against critical elements of an
opposing force.58 Controlling civilian populations involves exerting limited force in many
places at once. Innovations in military technology presumably inﬂuence the classic elements
of ﬁrepower, mobility and protection.59 While the last two elements increase the ability of a
military force of a given size to exert combat power and to control a populated space, the ﬁrst
factor leads optimal force structure in different directions. Heavy (strategic) bombers and
missile cruisers are ineffective tools for crowd control. The logic of conventional war
increasingly demands relatively large allocations of capital. In contrast, the logic of conquest
and control calls for ‘old fashioned’ labour-intensive force structures – many soldiers with
relatively little mechanization. The divergence of optimal force structures should mean that
sophisticated capital-intensive militaries, armies that tend to win the wars they ﬁght, should
be less and less effective as occupiers. To the degree that the determinants of battleﬁeld and
colonial effectiveness differ, and to the extent that resources available to the military are ﬁnite,
nations contemplating colonizing another country must choose between a military that is
optimized for conventional combat, and a force structure intended primarily for occupation.
Economic Development: When Empire Pays, and When It Does Not
A central debate in the study of imperialism is over how much nations proﬁted from
empire.60 While a number of studies provide evidence that colonies could be proﬁtable, at
least over certain periods,61 scholars remain divided in their reading of the ‘balance sheet’
of empire.62 This debate is instrumental to our objectives in explaining the basic imperial
dynamic, however. We note simply that colonial conquest offered a perceived economic
beneﬁt to key constituencies or decision makers. Subsequently, the value of empire
declined. If colonial holdings were never proﬁtable (we doubt this), then rising costs of
control, or declining beneﬁts from markets or resources would eventually make clinging
to empire prohibitive. Alternately, if empire was never a net drain on the imperial
exchequer (we doubt this too), then plummeting proﬁts must still weaken the forces of
58 Baron Antoine Henri de Jomini, The Art of War (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1971 [1838]).
59 Basil Henry Liddell Hart, The Strategy of Indirect Approach (London: Faber & Faber, 1946).
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N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); Stephen Brooks, ‘The Globalization of Production and the
Changing Beneﬁts of Conquest’, Journal of Conﬂict Resolution, 43 (1999), 646–70; Stephen Brooks,
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(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005); Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the
British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2003).
61 David K. Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire 1830–1914 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1973); Richard D. Wolff, The Economics of Colonialism: Britain and Kenya, 1870–1930 (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974); Jacques Marseille, Empire coloniale et capitalisme franc¸aise. Histoire
d’un divorce (Paris: Albin Michel, 1984); Avner Offer, ‘The British Empire, 1870–1914: A Waste of
Money?’ Economic History Review, 46 (1993), 215–38; Niall Ferguson, ‘The British Empire Revised: The
Costs and Beneﬁts of ‘‘Anglobalization’’ ’, Historically Speaking, 4 (2003), 21–7.
62 See, for example, Lance E. Davis and Robert Huttenback, ‘The Political Economy of British
Imperialism: Measures of Beneﬁts and Support’, Journal of Economic History, 42 (1982), 119–30; Lance
E. Davis and Robert Huttenback, Mammon and the Pursuit of Empire: The Political Economy of British
Imperialism, 1860–1912 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986); Peter J. Cain and Anthony G.
Hopkins, ‘Gentlemanly Capitalism and British Expansion Overseas II: New Imperialism, 1850–1945’,
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colonialism and embolden opponents. Social forces within the metropolis (i.e. democracy)
or in the colony (i.e. nationalism) could also have tipped the balance sheet, as we discuss
later. The critical issue, which appears to be widely accepted, is that the economic beneﬁts
of empire declined over time.63
Nations, like ﬁrms or individuals, must address their wants through some combination
of production, purchase and theft.64 Stealing is appealing when taking is more lucrative
than making or trading.65 Theft can be preferred to purchase or production when the
technology of stealing (appropriation) is relatively advanced, when the inputs to theft are
relatively abundant, and when that which is taken is relatively valuable. Within borders,
muggings and other property crimes tend to be committed by unemployed or unskilled
labour.66 Governments attempt to reduce the appeal of private theft by limiting access to
the technology of appropriation (regulating ﬁrearms, explosives, locksmiths, etc.) by
improving the productivity of non-appropriative labour (schools, vocational training), or
by reducing the expected beneﬁts of theft (police and prisons).67
In contrast, the international system lacks some of the tools available domestically
to discourage appropriation.68 Across national borders, governments or populations seek to
prevent aggression by making conquest expensive (defence) or occupation unproﬁtable
(nationalism, ‘scorched earth’ policies). Countries cannot much alter the productivity
of foreign labour, however, and typically nations control their own appropriative technology.
International incentives for choosing production over predation thus depend heavily on
environmental conditions, and on exogenous change.69 If, for example, labour productivity
rises in countries with the best appropriative technology, or if labour becomes scarce in these
economies, while capital abundance drives down returns on appropriated capital, then
countries capable of conquest will no longer covet colonial holdings, though these countries
may continue to use force in a punitive manner for other political (policy) reasons.70
The question of whether to trade or take is one civilizations have confronted throughout
history.71 Indeed, the two processes are linked. Vikings, the marauders of feudal Europe, were
63 Doyle, Empires.
64 Charles Tilly, ‘War Making and State Making as Organized Crime’, in Peter Evans, Dietrich
Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol, eds, Bringing the State Back In (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1985), 169–87; Jack Hirshleifer, ‘Conﬂict and Rent-seeking Success Functions: Ratio vs. Difference
Models of Relative Success’, Public Choice, 63 (1989), 101–12.
65 Mancur Olson, ‘Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development’, American Political Science Review, 87
(1993), 567–76.
66 Paul Strasburg, Violent Delinquents: A Report to the Ford Foundation from the Vera Institute of
Justice (New York: Monarch Press, 1978); Mercer L. Sullivan, Getting Paid: Youth Crime and Work in the
Inner City (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989).
67 Gary S. Becker, ‘Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach’, Journal of Political Economy, 76
(1968), 169–217; Pablo Fajnzylber, Daniel Lederman and Norman Loayza, ‘Crime and Victimization: An
Economic Perspective’, Economia, 1 (2000), 219–302.
68 Joseph M. Grieco, ‘Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realist Critique of the Newest
Liberal Institutionalism’, International Organization, 42 (1988), 485–507; Lake, ‘Anarchy, Hierarchy, and
the Variety of International Institutions’.
69 Jack Hirshleifer, ‘Economics and Biology: Evolution, Selection, and the Economic Principle’,
American Economic Review, 68 (1978), 238–43; Jack Hirshleifer, The Dark Side of the Force: Economic
Foundations of Conﬂict Theory (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001).
70 Erik Gartzke and Dominic Rohner, ‘To Conquer or Compel: War, Peace, and Economic
Development’ (Working Papers, University of California–San Diego, 2010).
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also the chief merchants of the era.72 After robbing the churches and great houses, they often
established trading posts where less lucrative goods were bought and sold.73 Bank robbers
often have bank accounts, while mobsters and petty criminals rob one person in order to pay
another. Identifying how nations proﬁt from particular combinations of trade and theft is
central to the logic of empire.74
The Imperialists’ Dilemma: ‘Mercantilism Made Me Do It’
Imperialism creates an opportunity for states to engage in anti-competitive economic
behaviour.75 The metropolis is in a position to determine whether trade will be allowed
with third parties.76 These incentives extend beyond the dependencies of any imperial
power when vertical integration restricts the growth of non-imperialist states. Barriers to
market entry and to raw materials in foreign colonies encourage nations to seek their own
colonies and to adopt mercantilist policies.
Prisoner’s dilemma beggar-thy-neighbour colonial policies ensured that industrializing
states sought colonial holdings to gain access to markets and resources. As key imperial
powers chose to prevent other nations from trading in their colonial hinterlands, nations
experiencing follow-on industrialization were forced to choose between limited growth
and entry into empire. The mad rush to conquer the remaining unclaimed portions of the
globe followed, not so much because every property was proﬁtable, but because staying
home ensured that possible future proﬁts would never arise. The process of territorial
‘crowding out’ reversed itself once the predominant power no longer sought markets
through colonial occupation, but instead used its leverage to open access.
Preliminary attempts by the United States to acquire colonies suggest that moral
opposition to empire could be contained.77 Instead, later industrialization and large
internal markets gave the United States a comparative advantage in free trade, while
colonial expansion threatened war with Europe.78
72 Karl W. Deutsch, ‘Medieval Unity and the Economic Conditions for an International Civilization’,
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 10 (1944), 18–35.
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Diego, 2006), or geopolitical concerns (Nicholas J. Spykman, ‘Frontiers, Security, and International
Organization’, Geographical Review, 32 (1942), 436–47; Nicholas J. Spykman, The Geography of the Peace
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1944)), also inﬂuence the logic of empire. Yet empire is an extremely
expensive pastime if it does not pay.
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MODELLING IMPERIALISM
We construct three main versions of a game-theoretic model of imperialism: a basic model
of the effects of power, technology and economic development, a second model of
domestic political liberalization and a third model that examines the role of system effects
(mercantilism) in perpetuating empire. Supply-side arguments (nationalism, colonial
populations) are modelled by varying the cost of appropriation. Additional treatments
(the size of empire, insurgency) appear in two appendices.79 We begin with two actors
(N, S) that represent tribal groups, countries or regions of the world.
The Basic Model
We can think of the potential for colonization as ‘lumpy’. A critical mass of ﬁghting
effectiveness and labour is necessary before a state can achieve any result. Warships and
adventurers were needed before Europe could discover, and then conquer, the New
World. Even neighbouring states must acquire some minimal level of capabilities to
engage in territorial aggression. Appropriative activities thus only occur if the ﬁghting
effectiveness r is higher than some arbitrary level r^. Formally, the restriction r4r^ ensures
that a state projects power only when the threshold has been exceeded.
The production functions for actors N and S are displayed as Equations 1 and 2 below:
yN ¼ aLaNKbN ð1Þ
yS ¼ bLcSKdS ; ð2Þ
where y5 production output, L5 labour allocated to domestic production, K5 physical
capital and land stock, a, b5 total factor productivities, and where a,b,c,d5 exogenous
parameters.
These production functions take the standard Cobb–Douglas form, where output
depends on the two factors of production, capital K and labour L, which are complements
and are subject to decreasing returns (i.e. a, 1, b, 1, c, 1, d, 1). Actors also have a
time endowment normalized to 1 and choose a proportion of time to allocate to
production and to appropriation or defence:
1 ¼ Li þ Fi þDi; ð3Þ
where F5 time devoted to appropriation, D5 time used for defence, and where iA[N,S].
Imagine that N develops a technological advantage. Europe’s historical turning point
began in the late feudal period when ideas and technology from the Muslim world
diffused through Europe.80 At this stage, neither N nor S has reached the technological
threshold for overseas conquest ðrSorNor^Þ. By the ﬁfteenth century, however, N
reaches the threshold, while S does not, rSor^orN .
In the age of imperialism, rSor^. S cannot colonize N. Accordingly, S always chooses
FS5 0. Thus, the time constraint of S becomes LS1DS5 1. Since N will not be attacked
by S, N chooses DN5 0 and its time constraint becomes LN1FN5 1. Thus, there is
asymmetry in the incentive structure of the two players. This simpliﬁes the analysis and
reﬂects historical conditions.
79 All appendices are available online at: http://www.journals.cambridge.org/jps.
80 Bernard Lewis, The Muslim Discovery of Europe (New York: W. W. Norton, 1982); Bernard Lewis,
Cultures in Conﬂict: Christians, Muslims, and Jews in the Age of Discovery (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995).
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Colonizing an opponent entails appropriating land and physical capital, assets that
are valuable but can either be bought or stolen. The prospects of colonization
are endogenous in our framework and depend on the ﬁghting efforts of N and S. We
ﬁrst discuss the potential corner solutions where one or both actors select zero ﬁghting
effort. Clearly, when FN5 0, no colonization takes place. In this case, there is no ﬁghting
and both actors just receive their own domestic production: N receives the entire yN,
and S the entire yS. Further, if N makes a positive appropriation effort FN. 0, but S
fails to defend itself DS5 0, we assume that N captures the whole production of
both actors. Note, however, that in equilibrium we never observe FN. 0 and DS5 0,
because S would always be better off selecting a positive defence level (as we discuss
further below).
We next introduce the payoff functions for interior solutions when both players
select positive ﬁghting efforts, FN. 0 and DS. 0. We assume that the part of the land
and physical capital in S captured by N depends on the difference between the ﬁghting
efforts of N and S. When FN is much larger than DS, we assume that on average N
captures a large part of KS, while N captures an intermediate portion of KS when FN
and DS are of similar size, and so on. Use of a linear appropriation technology allows
for a tractable model with production functions with decreasing returns to labour and
capital (i.e. Cobb–Douglas).81 As actors trade off concave production gains with linear
appropriation gains, there is always a unique interior optimum involving positive ﬁghting
levels of both players. Formally, Equation 4 represents the payoff (utility) function
for actor N:
VN ¼ aLaNKbN þ
1
2
þ yðrNFN rSDSÞ
 
KS; ð4Þ
where r5 ﬁghting effectiveness or latent power (0, r, 1), and y5a parameter
(0, y, 0.5).
N’s payoff equals its production output ðaLaNKbNÞ, plus what capital and territory it
‘steals’ from S. The term 1
2
þ yðrNFN  rSDSÞ
 
is the ‘contest success function’.82
As mentioned above, the greater the appropriation effort of N, and the lower the
defensive effort of S, the more capital and territory N gains. The parameter y refers to the
decisiveness of the ﬁghting effort. If y ¼ 1
2
, ﬁghting is perfectly effective in determining
distribution, whereas if y5 0, the time spent on ﬁghting has no effect on the distribution
of beneﬁts.83 We also include a friction component to the ﬁghting effort (12 r).
Improvements in military effectiveness or capabilities (higher r) make appropriation more
efﬁcient, which also means that N has less to lose by ﬁghting S.
We shall now look inside the ‘black box’ of ﬁghting effectiveness or latent military
power. It is important to distinguish between the concepts of ‘ﬁghting effectiveness’ and
‘ﬁghting technology’. While the ﬁrst concept refers to how successful a state is at
appropriating or controlling colonial holdings for a given level of ﬁghting effort, the
second refers to the capital intensiveness of an army (i.e. the capital:labour ratio of
defence or appropriation). Development leads to capital accumulation and results in the
81 Several studies use similar linear appropriation technologies. See, for example, Dominic Rohner,
‘Beach Holiday in Bali or East Timor? Why Conﬂict Can Lead to Under- and Overexploitation of
Natural Resources’, Economics Letters, 92 (2006), 113–17.
82 Jack Hirshleifer, ‘Conﬂict and Rent-seeking Success Functions: Ratio vs. Difference Models of
Relative Success’, Public Choice, 63 (1989), 101–12.
83 Rohner, ‘Beach Holiday in Bali or East Timor?’
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substitution of capital for labour in both civilian production and the military. This
substitution (an increase in ﬁghting technology) is usually less than one to one. Hence, it
makes sense to think of ﬁghting technology as a concave, increasing function of total
factor productivity. This higher capital-intensity of the army may or may not lead to
greater ﬁghting effectiveness (although if it does improve ﬁghting effectiveness, we can
assume that this rise is also less than one to one). While it is reasonable to think that
military technology is very important for conquest (e.g. ships are crucial), for the control
of the colonized populations labour may matter more than capital, and capital-intensive
high-tech armies may not perform as well.
Given this, ﬁghting effectiveness, rN and rS, respectively, can be seen as a concave
function of the total national factor productivity denoted by a and b. We assume that rN
is a concave function of a, and that rS is a concave function of b, as increases in the
general technology level of a society result in less than proportional increases (or even
decreases) in ﬁghting effectiveness. Technology requires military specialization, which
optimizes force structures for battleﬁelds versus riot control or counterinsurgency.84
Factors such as muscle power and the morale of personnel are also effectively ﬁxed; thus,
doubling a country’s weapons less than doubles the country’s military strength.
A functional form that reﬂects this reasoning is r5 kam, where k5 constant, m, 1.85
Introducing the time constraint LN1FN5 1 into N’s payoff function and solving for
ﬁrst order conditions, we obtain N’s optimal level of LN:
LnN ¼
aaKbN
yrNKS
  1
1 a
; ð5Þ
where LnN 5 the optimal level of LN, and other variables or parameters are as described.
For simplicity, we will focus on parameter values for 0,LnN , 1, which guarantees that
there always exists an interior solution, and which is the most interesting case for our
research question.
Note that this interior LnN is the unique solution in the basic framework. An equilibrium
of no appropriation and no defence would not be sustainable as N would always have
incentives to deviate and choose some positive level of appropriation. Similarly, for
positive appropriation efforts of N, S would also always have incentives to select positive
levels of defensive activities.
N’s optimal production level increases with total factor productivity, and decreases with
ﬁghting effectiveness (its military power or capabilities). Productivity increases encourage
domestic production, while greater military power makes it more appealing to
appropriate (steal) land or capital from S. The net effect of production technology on
labour time is positive, however, as productivity increases yield less than proportional
increases, or even decreases, in ﬁghting effectiveness.
The payoff function for actor S follows a similar logic. S can either invest time into
production or defence. Its payoff simply corresponds to its economic output that is
84 Jeremy Black, War: Past, Present and Future (New York: St. Martin’s, 2000). Few states are able to
integrate military technologies effectively, while forces optimized for conventional war are at a
comparative disadvantage in asymmetric conﬂicts. See Stephen Biddle, ‘Assessing Theories of Future
Warfare’, Security Studies, 88 (1998), 1–74.
85 One could also imagine that ﬁghting effectiveness decays in the distance between metropolis
and colony: @r=@do0, where d5 distance, or assumes a speciﬁc function, as in the gravity model:
(12 r)5vd2, where v is exogenous.
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produced using its remaining capital (the part that has not been appropriated by N) and
its time devoted to labour. Formally:
VS ¼ bLcS
1
2
þ yðrSDS  rNFNÞ
 
KS
 	d
: ð6Þ
The part of KS controlled by N,
1
2
þ yðrNFN  rSDSÞ, and the portion owned by S,
1
2
þ yðrSDS  rNFNÞ, sum to 1. Introducing the time constraints, LS1DS5 1 and
LN1FN5 1, and setting the ﬁrst derivative of Equation 6 with respect to LS equal to
zero, we obtain S’s reaction function:
LnS ¼
c 1
2
þ yðrS  rNð1LnNÞÞ
 
yrSðc þ dÞ
; ð7Þ
where LnS5 the optimal level of LS, and other variables or parameters are as described. As
expected, S’s defence effort increases (lower LS) in N’s colonization effort (lower LN).
The ﬁrst and second waves of European colonization (Latin America, Asia) can be
explained using the basic model outlined above. The third wave of colonization involves
system effects discussed below. As illustrated in Figure 1, threshold conditions initially
constrain territorial empire. The level where domestic production technology reaches this
ﬁrst threshold (such that rN4r^ ) is labelled a1. Incentives for empire then decay gradually
with increasing productivity. Finally, colonialism collapses when development reaches a2.
The rapidity in the fall of colonialism can be accounted for by ﬁxed costs (see Appendix A)86
or by democratization (see the next subsection).
Figure 1 reveals that the relationship between productivity (economic development)
and efforts to acquire colonies is non-linear. Initially, development increases the ability to
plunder, encouraging the pursuit of empire once the threshold capabilities are achieved.
As productivity continues to increase, however, and capital accumulates, incentives to
appropriate decline (N prefers making to taking).
HYPOTHESIS 1. The effect of economic development on territorial empire should be
strictly concave, ﬁrst increasing, and then later decreasing the likelihood
of a country possessing colonial holdings.
FN
1 2 
Fig. 1. The level of colonization effort chosen by N
86 All appendices are available online at: http://www.journals.cambridge.org/jps.
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Unsurprisingly, military power probably makes empire more attractive. While power is a
somewhat ambiguous term – referring alternatively to the potential to inﬂuence and to the
act of inﬂuencing – there are reasonably direct empirical analogues for the notion of
capable or effective military power. We thus hypothesize that capability should increase
the appeal of empire.
HYPOTHESIS 2. Increasing military effectiveness (greater capabilities/latent power) should
make countries more likely to hold colonies.
Fighting technology can also be measured empirically, as we discuss in the empirical section
below. The model does not tell us directly whether ﬁghting technology leads to more or less
territorial empire. However, we have speculated that capital-intensive armies do a poorer job
at controlling subject populations. As nations accumulate capital, it is substituted for labour
in both civilian and military (appropriative) production technologies. If, in addition, optimal
force structures for winning wars and for plundering populations diverge with development,
then we expect that the capital-intensiveness of an army is negatively associated with
maintaining colonies.
HYPOTHESIS 3. Increasing ﬁghting technology (more capital-intensive military) should
tend to discourage territorial empire.
Political Liberalization
Some scholars have suggested that European democratization contributed to decolonization.87
In this section, we examine the possibility that political liberalization discourages territorial
empire.
Appropriation and production decisions do not result from a plebiscite. Leaders and key
political supporters may receive intense beneﬁts from appropriation, even if empire is not
socially optimal for the country as a whole. In the model below, the task of the government is
to choose and impose a uniﬁed level of labour L, which can be more or less close to socially
optimal levels, but which is eventually adopted by both the population and the elite. This
politically optimal level is found by optimizing Equation 8, the payoff function for the
government of N, with respect to labour L.
VGN ¼ jVPN þ ð1jÞVEN  zðVEN VPNÞ; ð8Þ
where VGN5payoff function of the government of N, j5 relative weight attributed to the
collective payoff function of the population, VPN5payoff function of the population of N,
VEN5payoff function of the ruling elite of N, z is the parameter capturing the costs of
political instability.
The government cares about the payoff function of the population, as the leader wants
to stay in power. However, for similar reasons, it also cares about the payoff function of
the ruling elite. The relative weight of the two payoff functions depends on the level of
democratization (M). As a regime becomes more democratic, the weight attributed by the
leader to the utility of the population increases, @j=@M40. A complete theory of
democratization would endogenize j in terms of other parameters or variables. Making j
exogenous serves our purposes here and simpliﬁes exposition.
87 See, for example, Kahler, Decolonization in Britain and France; Snyder, Myths of Empire; David
Strang, ‘The Inner Incompatibility of Empire and Nation: Popular Sovereignty and Decolonization’,
Sociological Perspectives, 35 (1992), 367–84.
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We also model the risk of political instability due to distributive conﬂicts that occur if
relative payoffs of VEN and VPN are quite different. This is captured by the term
z(VEN2VPN), which we can represent as z(VEN2VPN) rather than in absolute values,
z|VEN2VPN|, assuming conventionally that elites are richer, more productive and can
more easily capture rents from colonies: aEN.aPN, KEN.KPN, rEN. rPN. Elites have
better access to business relationships,88 and to political power,89 extracting heavy rents
from the country’s colonial policies. If elites beneﬁted from empire at the expense of the
larger population,90 or if democratization in Europe allowed moral sentiment to hold
sway,91 then democracy should lead to a decline in territorial empire.92
Given that the level of labour is imposed by the government, L5LEN5LPN, it follows
from Equation 4 that VEN.VPN, if the assumptions aEN.aPN, KEN.KPN, rEN. rPN
hold and if aEN and aPN, as well as bEN and bPN, are of a similar magnitude. Introducing
Equation 4 for both the elite and the population into the government’s payoff function
(Equation 8), we obtain Equation 9. The new variables x, y and z are introduced to
facilitate interpretation of the results. For the purposes of illustration only, we further
assume that a5 aEN5 aPN and b5 bEN5 bPN.
VGN ¼ jðxPNLa yPNL þ zPNÞ þ ð1jÞðxENLa yENL þ zENÞ
zðxENLa yENL þ zEN  ðxPNLa yPNL þ zPNÞÞ; ð9Þ
where xPN ¼ aPNKbPN ; yPN ¼ yrPNKS; zPN ¼ 12 þ yðrPN  rSDSÞ
 
KS, xEN ¼ aENKbEN ,
yEN ¼ yrENKS; and where zEN ¼ 12 þ yðrEN  rSDSÞ
 
KS.
Taking ﬁrst order conditions, we obtain Equation 10, the optimal labour level set by
government:
LnGN ¼
aððj þ zÞxPN þ ð1j zÞxENÞ
ðj þ zÞyPN þ ð1j zÞyEN
  1
1 a
¼ aððj þ zÞaPNK
b
PN þ ð1j zÞaENKbENÞ
ðj þ zÞyrPNKS þ ð1j zÞyrENKS
  1
1 a
: ð10Þ
Note that for xPN5 xEN the result for L
n
GN is just identical to the result in Equation 5:
LnGN ¼ LnN ¼
aaKb
N
yrNKS

  1
1 a
. It is also interesting to see that political instability increases
88 Cain and Hopkins, British Imperialism.
89 Snyder, Myths of Empire.
90 Daron Acemoglu, ‘Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conﬂict, Commitment and Politics’,
Journal of Comparative Economics, 31 (2003), 620–52; Mirjam E. Sørli, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Ha˚vard
Strand, ‘Why Is There So Much Conﬂict in the Middle East?’ Journal of Conﬂict Resolution, 49 (2005),
141–65.
91 Robert Jackson, Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Third World (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1990); Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative
Historical Analysis (London: Routledge, 1992).
92 For claims that democracies are imperialistic, see Michael Haas, ‘When Democracies Fight One
Another, Just What is the Punishment for Disobeying the Law?’(paper presented at the Annual Meetings
of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1995); Galtung, The Decline and Fall of Empires;
Errol A. Henderson, Democracy and War: The End of an Illusion (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2002);
Spruyt, Ending Empire.
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the weight attributed to the population’s payoff. In fact, increases in z have exactly the
same effect as increases in j. By moving L closer to the population’s optimum, inequality
between elite and population is reduced, which decreases the government’s loss resulting
from political turmoil.
Whether democratization (higher j) leads to a higher or lower LnGN depends on the
relative size of LnEN and L
n
PN , where
LnPN ¼
aPNaKbPN
yrPNKS

  1
1 a ¼ axPN
yPN

  1
1 a
andLnEN ¼
aENaKbEN
yrENKS

  1
1 a ¼ axEN
yEN

  1
1 a
:
Assuming that elites are richer (KEN.KPN), and more productive (aEN.aPN), implies
that xEN. xPN. Assuming that elites extract more of the rents from colonies (rEN. rPN)
implies that yEN. yPN. Whether on the whole L
n
EN is greater or smaller than L
n
PN depends
on the relative size of the wealth-productivity effect on the one hand (xEN versus xPN) and
of the rent-extracting effect (yEN versus yPN) on the other. If the difference in wealth and
productivity is large, but elites are much better at extracting rents (yEN  yPN), then
LnEN ,L
n
PN . This implies that democratization (a larger j) reduces colonization, as the
greater weight of LnPN increases L
n
GN .
93
Colonial holdings could have continued to proﬁt elites even if they produced losses overall.
Rapid decolonization can be explained by economic factors alone (see Appendix A),94 but
political liberalization could also have played a role. We must rely on empirical assessment to
determine what mix of factors triggered decolonization. Domestic politics suggests the
following hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 4. Democracies should be less likely to possess (or to seek to acquire) colonies.
Accounting for System Effects
The logic of empire may be conditioned as well by system-level variables. The structure
of the global economy is affected by the choices of multiple nations. While free markets
are socially optimal, individual participants often have incentives to engage in anti-
competitive policies, if able.95 Countries may pursue or perpetuate colonial holdings if
other countries inhibit free trade or capital.
Parsimonious models explain particular relationships, while omitting others. Different
models also reﬂect competing claims in the literature and allow us to compare the
implications of different assumptions. We next relax the assumption of a single imperialist
country, including two players N1 and N2, that compete over access to S. We use the Nash
equilibrium solution concept to solve a game in which the two imperialist countries
choose between producing (L), and ﬁghting (F).
Li þ Fi ¼ 1; with i ¼ N1;N2: ð11Þ
93 Economic development results in higher values of aEN, aPN, rEN, rPN, which increases xEN, xPN, yEN,
yPN, though not necessarily at the same rate. The net effect of democracy thus varies with time and
development.
94 All appendices are available online at: http://www.journals.cambridge.org/jps.
95 John A. C. Conybeare, Trade Wars: The Theory and Practice of International Commercial Rivalry
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1987).
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Equation 12 displays the payoff function of country N1 (N2’s payoff function is analogous):
VN1 ¼ LN1ðA þ B
1
2
þ cðrN1FN1  rN2FN2 Þ
 
ð1 lDSÞÞ
þ 1
2
þ cðrN1FN1  rN2FN2 Þ
 
ð1 lDSÞKS; ð12Þ
where A5marginal productivity of labour, B5potential marginal gains from trade,
c5parameter related to the decisiveness of the ﬁghting effort (with 0,cr0.5), r5N’s
ﬁghting effectiveness or power (0, r,1), and l5 a parameter related to the defensive
technology of player S.
Equation 12 has the same overall structure as Equation 4. However, since including a
second colonial power increases model complexity, we simplify other aspects to keep the
model tractable.96
The payoff for country N1 is composed of three elements. First, there are returns on
productive activities, which are increasing in parameter A. Secondly, there are gains from
trade that increase in parameter B and in the portion of country S that is controlled by
N1, ð12 þ cðrN1FN1  rN2FN2ÞÞð1 lDSÞ.97 Treating S as divisible can be interpreted as
the portion of the developing world controlled by a given imperialist power. Mercantilism
attempts to restrict trade with a given colony to the colonial power. Thus, if one country
(N1) acquired all of S, N2 would not trade.
The portion of country S that is colonized is represented by ð1 lDSÞ. Given that the focus
here is on the interaction between N1 and N2, we treat DS as exogenous. The part of this
colonized fraction of S that is controlled by N1 and that can be used as an exclusive trade
partner is speciﬁed by the difference-form contest success function ð1
2
þ cðrN1FN1  rN2FN2 ÞÞ.
The parameter c reﬂects how decisive ﬁghting is in determining the division of the colony. If
c50, ﬁghting does not affect the division of resources. For c50.5, ﬁghting is fully decisive.
We assume that ﬁghting has some strictly positive effect (i.e. c.0). The logic of this contest
success function parallels the basic model. When FN1 is larger than FN2 , N1 receives a greater
share of the colony, and vice versa.
The third component of country N1’s payoff is the portion of the value of the colony,
KS, that it captures through ﬁghting. Fighting for colonies against rival imperialist powers
results in a direct beneﬁt, the portion of KS gained, and in an indirect beneﬁt, the
possibility of trade. The proﬁt from appropriation must be balanced against productive
income lost due to friction from conﬂict.
Introducing players’ time constraints (11) into N1’s payoff function (12), we get
Equation 13:
VN1 ¼ LN1 ðA þ B
1
2
þ cðrN1 ð1LN1Þ  rN2ð1LN2 ÞÞ
 
ð1 lDSÞÞ
þ 1
2
þ cðrN1 ð1LN1 Þ  rN2ð1LN2ÞÞ
 
ð1 lDSÞKS: ð13Þ
Setting the ﬁrst derivative of equation (13) with respect to LN1 equal to zero and
expressing the result in terms of LN1 , we ﬁnd the optimal value of LN1 displayed in the
reaction function (14). The solution is analogous for player N2. Note that these are the
results for an interior solution. Corner solutions follow from the fact that neither variable
96 These simplifying assumptions are not critical to the main results of the model.
97 We again focus on the unique interior Nash Equilibrium with FN14 0, FN24 0.
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can become negative, LN1  0;FN1  0:
LnN1 ¼
A þ Bð1
2
þ cðrN1  rN2ÞÞð1 lDSÞ crN1KSð1 lDSÞ
2BrN1cð1 lDSÞ
þ rN2L
n
N2
2rN1
; ð14Þ
where LnN1 , resp. L
n
N2
are the optimal levels of LN1 , resp. LN2 .
According to Equation 14, the proportion of labour time N1 devotes to production
increases in its productivity (A), and decreases with a more attractive target (higher KS).
These ﬁndings are both consistent with the basic model, but in addition, systemic
competition now creates an ‘imperialist race’. The more time N2 spends on productive
activities (higher LN2 ), the more time country N1 devotes to production. Conversely, when
country N2 puts time effort into ﬁghting, country N1 does so also. Thus, colonization by
one power induces imperialism in other states:
HYPOTHESIS 5. A country is more likely to hold colonies when the system contains many
colonies.
The strategic interaction between the two imperialist countries N1 and N2 is illustrated in
Figure 2.98 The grey (black) lines represent the reaction function of country N1 (N2). The
solid (dashed) lines correspond to a case of low (high) productivity, A5 0.16 (A5 0.24).
The Nash equilibrium for the solid lines is at (0.5;0.5), and is (0.75;0.75) for the dashed
lines. The reaction functions for both countries are positively sloped, indicating that each
country increases its production effort for increases in the productive effort of the other
state. This also means that a state increases its colonization effort for increases in the
colonial activity of the other power.
A slight extension of the systemic model helps to explain how the move from
mercantilism to freer global markets helped to trigger rapid decolonization. Up to now,
we have assumed that all gains from trade depend on the territorial control of trade
partners (mercantilism). We can now allow that only a part g of the trade gains depends
L_
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L_N1
Reaction function N1
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N2
Fig. 2. The reaction functions of the countries N1 and N2
98 The following parameter values are used for the solid lines (they are symmetrical for both players):
A5 0.16, B5 0.8, KS5 1, c5 0.4, rN1 ¼ rN2 ¼ 1, l5 0.5, DS5 0. For the dotted lines we have
A5 0.24.
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on possession of colonies. The move from mercantilism to capitalism and freer trade is
reﬂected by a gradual decrease in g.99
We introduce the possibility of partially free trade by changing Equation 12 into
Equation 120 below:
VN1 ¼ LN1ðA þ Bð1 gÞ þ Bg
1
2
þ cðrN1FN1  rN2FN2 Þ
 
ð1 lDSÞÞ
þ 1
2
þ cðrN1FN1 rN2FN2Þ
 
ð1 lDSÞKS: ð120Þ
All variables are deﬁned as before. The parameter g can be interpreted as the level of
mercantilism. Naturally, the results for g5 1 are identical to the results presented above.
By contrast, g5 e (where e is an inﬁnitely small positive number) corresponds to a
capitalist free trade system.
Introducing the time constraints (Equation 11) into Equation 120 and computing the
ﬁrst-order conditions, we get:
LnN1 ¼
A þ Bð1 gÞ þ Bgð1
2
þ cðrN1 rN2 ÞÞð1 lDSÞ crN1KSð1 lDSÞ
2BgrN1cð1 lDSÞ
þ rN2L
n
N2
2rN1
:
ð140Þ
We can evaluate the effect of mercantilism and capitalism on incentives for imperialism
and decolonization by looking at the ﬁrst derivative of LN1 with respect to g. A negative
ﬁrst derivative implies that more capitalism (lower g) increases the incentives to produce
(higher LN1 ) and accordingly reduces the incentives to ﬁght (lower FN1 ) to gain or retain
control of foreign territory or markets. The ﬁrst derivative of LN1 with respect to g
becomes negative, if condition (15) holds:
A þ B4crN1KSð1 lDSÞ: ð15Þ
Condition 15 holds when the gains from production (A) and the gains from trade (B) are
each large relative to the product of S’s capital endowment, the ﬁghting effectiveness of
N1, and the pivotal nature of warfare. In the period after the Second World War, the
steady decay of barriers to trade, the relative poverty of developing countries, as well as
the rise of nationalist insurgency movements made colonialism less appealing. Changes in
the global economy had by the early twentieth century created conditions in which the
economics of colonies, as well as the vertical integration of production networks, was
increasingly inefﬁcient. Sources for raw materials proliferated. The ascendance of the
United States as a hegemon further degraded the economic advantages of empire.100
Mercantilism can be proxied empirically as a situation where the hegemon holds many
colonies.
HYPOTHESIS 6. A country is more likely to hold colonies when the hegemon has many
colonies.
99 With g in the denominator, the reaction function (140) is undeﬁned when g5 0. It makes sense to
treat free trade as an absolute that is only approximated empirically (after multiple World Trade
Organization rounds, trade is still not ‘free’).
100 William Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British
Empire 1941–45 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987).
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Development started with agricultural societies, moved through mercantilism, to be
followed by capitalism. We expect the effect of systemic development on colonial holdings
to be non-linear.
HYPOTHESIS 7. The effect of systemic development on territorial empire should be strictly
concave, ﬁrst increasing, and then later decreasing the likelihood of a
country possessing colonial holdings.
RESEARCH DESIGN AND DATA
While our theory applies to broad swaths of history, our empirical analysis is limited by
data availability to the last two centuries (1816–1992). Our unit-of-analysis is the country
year. We examine both dichotomous (presence or absence) and ordinal (count) indicators
of colonialism/decolonization. Given a dichotomous dependent variable, we use the
ReLogit estimator.101 We use negative binomial regression to estimate the number of
colonies a country holds. We correct for spatial dependence using Huber/White robust
standard errors. Independent variables are lagged by one year to address endogeneity.
We also include a set of spline variables to control for duration dependence.102 The
descriptive statistics of all variables are displayed in Table 3.
Dependent Variable
The dichotomous and count versions of the dependent variable come from two sources.
Strang provides a list of the start and end years for a large number of dependencies
beginning in the late ﬁfteenth century.103 Strang includes dependencies that are not under
colonial domination and cases where political boundaries change over time. This could be a
problem if dependencies operated under a different logic than colonies, or if dependencies
experience reorganization, but not decolonization. These discrepancies are bound to weaken
support for our claims. We also examine colony data generated by Ravlo et al.104 The
authors use these data as an independent variable as part of a statistical analysis of their
argument that democracies are less warlike towards former colonies.
Independent Variables
— Economic development: Given the need to cover substantial time periods before the
mid-twentieth century, we adopt two variables widely used as proxies for per capita
gross domestic product (GDP).105 (1) Energy Cons./Pop. comes from the COW
101 Gary King and Kangche Zeng, ‘Explaining Rare Events in International Relations’, International
Organization, 55 (2001), 693–715; Gary King and Langche Zeng, ‘Logistic Regression in Rare Events
Data’, Political Analysis, 9 (2001), 137–63. Results are equivalent using logit. A STATA ‘do’ ﬁle that
replicates the analysis is available from the authors.
102 Neal Beck, Jonathan Katz and Richard Tucker, ‘Taking Time Seriously: Time-series–Cross-section
Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable’, American Journal of Political Science, 42 (1998), 1260–88.
103 David Strang, ‘Global Patterns of Decolonization, 1500–1987’, International Studies Quarterly, 35
(1991), 429–54, Appendix.
104 Hilde Ravlo, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Han Dorussen, ‘Colonial War and the Democratic Peace’,
Journal of Conﬂict Resolution, 47 (2003), 520–48.
105 Seymour M. Lipset, ‘Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political
Development’, American Political Science Review, 53 (1959), 69–105; Ross E. Burkhart and Michael S.
Lewis-Beck, ‘Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis’, American Political Science
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National Material Capabilities dataset of total annual fuel consumption in coal-ton
equivalents.106 (2) Iron & Steel/Pop. measures the quantity of iron (1816–99) or steel
(1900–2000) produced by a country in a given year.
— Fighting Technology: No convention exists as to the measurement of ﬁghting
technology. Dupuy advocated an index where each weapon is given a lethality
score.107 The index requires detailed information that makes it unworkable here.
Furthermore, such an index does not really address a focus of our concern, the
capital-intensiveness of a country’s military organization. We adopt a simpler and
more direct measure of ﬁghting technology, dividing defence spending from the
Correlates of War National Material Capabilities dataset (CINC) by the number of
military personnel per country year.108 The result is a statistic analogous to GDP per
capita identifying which armies have advanced weaponry etc., and which do not.109
— Democracy: Polity data provide indexes based on formal constraints on the executive
(AUTOC) and institutional support for democracy (DEMOC).110 We prepare monadic
values by combining DEMOC and AUTOC scales as follows, [(DEMOCi2 AUTOCi)1 10]/2,
(where iA[A,B]). We add 10 to make all values non-negative and divide by 2 to yield a
0–10 index. We examine both the monadic values and higher and lower democracy
scores for states in a dyad.111
— Fighting Effectiveness: Capabilities determine the ability of states to project power and
conduct warfare abroad. We assess national military power or ﬁghting effectiveness
using the Correlates of War (COW) Composite Indicators of National Capabilities
(F’note continued)
Review, 88 (1994), 903–10; Ha˚vard Hegre et al., ‘Toward a Democratic Civil Peace? Democracy, Political
Change, and Civil War, 1816–1992’, American Political Science Review, 95 (2001), 33–48. The close ﬁt
between GDP and energy usage weakened after the 1970s oil shocks. Since our measures therefore
underreport development, estimates will tend to fall short of actual support for the hypotheses.
106 J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer and John Stuckey, ‘Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major
Power War’, in Bruce M. Russett, ed., Peace, War, and Numbers (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1972),
pp.19–48; J. David Singer, ‘Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of
States, 1816–1985’, International Interactions, 14 (1987), 115–32; Correlates of War Project, National
Material Capabilities Data Documentation, V. 3.0. State College, Pa.: The Pennsylvania State University,
http://cow2.la.psu.edu/2005.
107 Dupuy, Numbers, Predictions and War; Trevor N. Dupuy, Understanding War: History and a Theory
of Combat (New York: Paragon House, 1987).
108 COW provides military expenditure agues in nominal (current year) British pounds (1816–1913) and
US dollars (1914–2000). We used GDP deﬂators available at EH.net (URL: http://eh.net/hmit/) to obtain
constant (2000) dollars. See Louis D. Johnston and Samuel H. Williamson, Economic History Services
(Chicago, 2005); Lawrence H. Ofﬁcer, Exchange Rate Between the United States Dollar and the British
Pound, 1791–2004 (Chicago, 2004); Lawrence H. Ofﬁcer, The Annual Real and Nominal GDP for the
United Kingdom, 1086–2004 (Chicago, 2005). These documents and additional information are available
at: http://www.measuringworth.com/index.php.
109 A lowess regression and scatter plot of the military technology variable on GDP per capita reveals
the declining marginal relationship that is assumed by the model (plot available from the authors).
110 Keith Jaggers and Ted R. Gurr., ‘Transitions to Democracy: Tracking Democracy’s ‘‘Third Wave’’
with the Polity III Data’, Journal of Peace Research, 32 (1995), 469–82; Ted Robert Gurr, Keith Jaggers
and Will H. Moore, ‘Polity II: Political Structures and Regime Change’ (unpublished Codebook,
University of Maryland, 1989).
111 John R. Oneal, Bruce Russett and Michael L. Berbaum, ‘Causes of Peace: Democracy,
Interdependence, and International Organizations’, International Studies Quarterly, 47 (2003), 371–93;
John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, ‘The Kantian Peace: The Paciﬁc Beneﬁts of Democracy,
Interdependence, and International Organizations’, World Politics, 52 (1999), 1–37.
548 GARTZKE AND ROHNER
(CINC) score. CINC scores are computed as the weighted average of a state’s share of
total system population, urban population, energy consumption, iron and steel
production, military manpower and military expenditures. CINC is widely acknowl-
edged as an approximation of national power.
— Major Power Status: Major powers tend to be more active internationally, resulting in
more frequent conﬂict behaviour. Since they may also tend to be more capable and
prosperous, there is a danger that the relationship between development and conﬂict
might be confounded by major power politics. We include a dummy, Maj. Power,
coded (1) for the major powers.
— Temporal Dependence: Finally, we control for temporal dependence by constructing
four splines for each dependent variable, interpolated from a dummy matrix coding
the lag between directed dyad years of conﬂict initiation or onset.112
RESULTS
Results of our analysis of development, democracy, technology, hegemony and colonies
are summarized in two tables containing eight regressions. Each of the six regressions
listed in Table 1 estimates the probability that a given country possesses at least one
colony. Succeeding models introduce additional variables to test hypotheses, compare
model speciﬁcations or assess robustness.
As Model 1 in Table 1 reveals, no simple monotonic relationship exists between
economic development (Energy Cons./Pop.) and a nation’s status as a colonial power. In
contrast, both Hypothesis 2 and Hypothesis 3 appear to be borne out in these data. More
capable countries (Fighting Effectiveness) are more likely to possess colonies, ceteris
paribus, while nations with capital-intensive armed forces (Fighting Technology) are less
inclined towards territorial imperialism. Contrary to Hypothesis 4, democratic countries
appear much more likely to hold colonies. As we will see, this strongly counter-intuitive
ﬁnding depends largely on the incomplete statistical model speciﬁcation of Model 1.
Major power status appears largely irrelevant for the possession of colonies.
The linear speciﬁcation used for economic development in Model 1 may be inappropriate.
Model 2 adds a quadratic term for economic development.113 Introducing the second
quadratic term for development leads both coefﬁcients to become highly statistically
signiﬁcant. Energy Cons./Pop. and its square produce the concave function predicted by
Hypothesis 1. Fighting Effectiveness (Hypothesis 2) is positive and signiﬁcant, though at a
lower signiﬁcance threshold than previously. The modest signiﬁcance of the capabilities
variable suggests that power is not as important a determinant of colonial status as other
variables in the analysis, but this may be a by-product of the research design and available
data. Our theory and available intuition suggest that Fighting Effectiveness was most salient
during the onset of the colonial era, for the expansion of empire rather than for its demise.
Of course, the dataset contains only a limited portion of the period of imperial expansion.
In contrast to the power variable, Fighting Technology becomes statistically signiﬁcant
at a much higher threshold in Model 2. Since the available data cover the entire period of
112 Beck, Katz and Tucker, ‘Taking Time Seriously’.
113 We also examined a regression in which we added a quadratic term for ﬁghting technology. Both the
linear (2) and exponential (1) ﬁghting technology variables are statistically signiﬁcant, but the overall
effect of the two variables is negative for most values, with coefﬁcients and means as follows:
(258.0983 0.0190)1 (149.9243 0.0025)520.7346.
The Political Economy of Imperialism, Decolonization and Development 549
TABLE 1 The Political Economy of Decolonization
D.V.: Colonies
Strang (1990) Ravlo et al. (2003)
1 2 3 4 5 6
Indep. Variables Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff. Coeff.
(S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.) (S.E.)
Energy Cons./Pop. 20.0184 1.255*** 1.182*** 1.762*** 1.293*** 1.909***
(0.0172) (0.329) (0.310) (0.394) (0.313) (0.399)
Energy Cons./Pop.2 20.0922*** 20.132*** 20.166*** 20.143*** 20.183***
(0.0267) (0.0260) (0.0435) (0.0368) (0.0455)
Fighting Effectiveness 31.46** 29.82* 27.00* 43.93 48.37* 41.17
(11.70) (13.58) (12.85) (23.22) (24.29) (24.40)
Fighting Technology 214.76* 242.92*** 266.55*** 265.27*** 266.58*** 269.01***
(6.882) (10.65) (14.83) (17.79) (12.80) (18.68)
Energy3Fight Tech. 8.580*** 6.327*** 6.646*** 6.639***
(1.783) (1.450) (1.044) (1.536)
Regime Type 0.190*** 0.0586 0.0629 20.0276 0.0487 20.0103
(0.0486) (0.0518) (0.0542) (0.0604) (0.0563) (0.0649)
# Colonies System 6.145***
(0.904)
# Colonies Hegemon 0.0618***
(0.0143)
Sys. Energy/Pop. 12.35***
(3.424)
Sys. Energy/Pop.2 24.099***
(1.166)
US Energy/Pop. 22.317***
(0.585)
US Energy/Pop.2 0.168***
(0.0417)
Major Power 0.850 0.683 0.518 0.805 0.685 1.036
(0.776) (0.929) (0.973) (0.964) (0.952) (1.061)
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TABLE 1 (Continued)
# States in System 20.0365**
(0.0113)
# Major Powers 0.345
(0.186)
Intercept 0.747 1.038 1.328* 21.883** 0.656 0.781
(0.546) (0.546) (0.579) (0.701) (0.560) (1.364)
N 9671 9671 9671 10474 10474 10474
Sig. levels: y: 10%; *: 5%; **: 1%; ***: 0.1%. Coefﬁcients and S.E.’s for spline variables suppressed.
Sources: David Strang, ‘From Dependency to Sovereignty: An Event History Analysis of Decolonization 1870–1987’, American Sociological
Review, 55 (1990), 846–60; Hilde Ravlo, Nils Petter Gleditsch and Han Dorussen, ‘Colonial War and the Democratic Peace’, Journal of
Conﬂict Resolution, 47 (2003), 520–48. For Relogit estimator, see Gary King and Kangche Zeng, ‘Explaining Rare Events in International
Relations’, International Organization, 55 (2001), 693–715; and ‘Logistic Regression in Rare Events Data’, Political Analysis, 9 (2001),
137–63.
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decolonization, the mechanisms encouraging the end of empire are able to perform more
effectively, especially with the proper model speciﬁcation. With the addition of a second term
for economic development, the Regime Type variable is no long positive and signiﬁcantly
signiﬁcant, though the relationship remains positive. It appears that democracy does not
inﬂuence decolonization one way or the other (Hypothesis 4). The major power status
variable also continues to be statistically insigniﬁcant.
Civilian and military technology are of course related.114 Treating the two processes as
independent, when they are not, risks biasing estimates of their respective independent
effects. Model 3 adds an interaction term between Energy Cons./Pop. and Fighting
Technology. Energy3Fight Tech. is statistically signiﬁcant and positive indicating that,
for small values of Fighting Technology, increases in civilian economic development tend
to increase the probability of colonial holdings. While there is some synergy between
civilian and military technology, all three development and technology variables remain
highly statistically signiﬁcant in the presence of the interaction term.
Figure 3 offers a three-dimensional plot of the predicted probability of an independent
country possessing at least one colony based on Model 3. Development (Energy/Pop.)
increases from left to right, while ﬁghting technology (Mil. Tech.) increases from front to
back in the image. The probability of colonial possessions is plotted on the vertical axis.
The resulting plot looks roughly like a ‘grand piano’, ‘mesa’ or the bow of a ship (facing
slightly right of the reader). Recall that in the formal model, ﬁghting technology is a
declining function of development. Imagine beginning in the left foreground of the ﬁgure
(low Energy/Pop. and Mil. Tech.) and moving in a diagonal line towards the most advanced
countries (high Energy/Pop. and Mil. Tech.). The declining marginal impact of development
on ﬁghting technology leads the trajectory of a nation to veer right as we travel ﬁrst up to the
piano/mesa/boat, and then down again to the ﬂoor/valley/water on the right side of the ﬁgure.
Low
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Fig. 3. Estimated effects of development and military technology on empire (Model 3)
114 Energy Cons./Pop. and Fighting Technology are moderately correlated (rE 0.3). While linear and
squared terms are highly correlated, multicollinearity is not indicated, as the linear terms are statistically
insigniﬁcant by themselves, the non-linear variables are signiﬁcant, other variables are unaffected, and
theory dictates this speciﬁcation.
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Notice also that the transition to and from colonialism is abrupt. Colonial holdings were
acquired as nations expanded their ability to subdue distant territories. They were abandoned
suddenly, collectively, as if the logic of empire had suddenly fallen off a cliff.
While Hypotheses 1 through 3 are supported, but not Hypothesis 4, we have yet to
assess the systemic and hegemonic hypotheses. Models 4 and 5 in Table 1 introduce
variables for the number of colonies in the system (Hypothesis 5) and the number of
colonies held by the hegemon (Hypothesis 6). Neither hypothesis can be rejected.115
Systemic and hegemonic colonial portfolios clearly inﬂuence individual national decisions
to maintain or abandon empire. By ‘crowding out’ access to markets and raw materials,
the presence of colonies in the system appears to have led to additional acts of imperialism
by other nations. Conversely, as soon as the hegemon or other nations abandoned empire,
countries found perpetuation of a colonial system to be less necessary.
Model 6 completes Table 1 by introducing variables to evaluate systemic development,
the effects of American hegemony, and to control for factors relevant to the systemic
variables.116 Consistent with Hypothesis 7, Sys. Energy/Pop. and its square reveal a
concave relationship between systemic development levels and the appeal of colonies.
Development initially leads to systemic predation as states compete to capture resources
and markets. These incentives reverse themselves, however, as the gains from production
(A in the formal model) increase with development and the gains from trade (B) grow
TABLE 2 Political Economy and the Number of Colonies
D.V.: # of Colonies Strang (1990) Ravlo et al. (2003)
7 8
Indep. Variables Coeff. (S.E.) Coeff. (S.E.)
Energy Cons./Pop. 0.871** (0.281)
Energy Cons./Pop.2 20.094*** (0.029)
Iron & Steel/Pop. 17.297*** (4.676)
Iron & Steel/Pop.2 229.698** (10.034)
Fighting Effectiveness 7.712 (7.711) 26.749y (15.890)
Fighting Technology 226.300** (9.395) 224.975* (11.272)
Dev.3Fight Tech. 3.023y (1.602) 45.906y (25.591)
Regime Type 0.066 (0.051) 20.114y (0.063)
# Colonies Hegemon 0.027*** (0.007) 0.035*** (0.005)
Major Power 1.614* (0.780) 0.269 (0.986)
Intercept 21.962* (0.834) 23.762*** (0.451)
/ln(a) 2.311** (0.331) 1.273** (0.311)
N 9671 10865
Log-likelihood 28159.553 28959.683
x2(8) 76.11 200.466
Sig. levels: y: 10%; *: 5%; **: 1%; ***: 0.1%. Spline variables suppressed.
Notes: The values displayed are negative binomial regression coefﬁcients.
115 A variable coded for the proportion of territories that are colonies (colonies/(colonies1 countries))
yields equivalent results.
116 We drop the # Colonies variables that are highly collinear with the systemic/hegemonic development
variables.
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with the size of the world economy. Similarly, the appeal of colonization appears to ebb
with increases in American productivity, though at a declining marginal rate. As the chief
proponent, and beneﬁciary, of free trade in the twentieth century, the United States
possessed few incentives to prop up the European colonial system when the United States
became a hegemon. We add # States in System and # Major Powers to evaluate the effects
of changing system structure and size. Having more major powers in the system does not
signiﬁcantly increase territorial empire once monadic and systemic development,
technology and other factors are considered. The number of states in the system is
negatively associated with colonialism, though these two variables are of course rough
complements.
Table 2 lists two negative binomial regressions, each estimating the number of colonies
a country holds. Theoretical expectations for the count of colonies are less precise
TABLE 3 Descriptive Statistics for All Variables Used in Table 1 and Table 2
Variable name Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Dependent Variables
Colony Dummy (Strang) 10300 0.1574757 0.3642664 0 1
Colony Dummy (Ravlo et al.) 11115 0.1964912 0.3973621 0 1
Colony Count (Strang) 10300 1.710291 7.495472 0 73
Colony Count (Ravlo et al.) 11115 1.301664 4.955584 0 50
Key Indep. Variables
Energy Cons./Pop. 12590 1.683821 5.273448 0 87.94954
Energy Cons./Pop.2 12590 30.6423 291.3086 0 7735.122
Iron & Steel/Pop. 13008 0.1155529 0.7869664 0 18.16338
Iron & Steel/Pop.2 13008 0.6326209 9.46593 0 329.9084
Energy3Mil. Tech. 12590 0.1119399 1.067389 0 60.71391
Fighting Technology 13212 0.0190369 0.0459871 0 2.797716
Fighting Technology2 13212 0.0024771 0.087587 0 7.827213
Fighting Effectiveness (CINC) 13020 0.0146515 0.0392248 0 0.383864
Regime Type 12925 4.142592 3.533467 0 10
# Colonies System (Strang) 10482 94.21847 35.38304 35 148
# Colonies System (Ravlo et al.) 13020 57.48694 40.79045 0 120
# Colonies (proportion, Ravlo) 13020 0.3862178 0.2874053 0 0.7964602
# Colonies (proportion, Strang) 10482 0.5435864 0.2140161 0.1785714 0.8130081
# Colonies Heg. (Strang) 13212 17.18377 23.27788 0 73
# Colonies Heg. (Ravlo et al.) 13020 9.106836 15.38836 0 48
US Energy/Pop. 13212 7.16194 3.916243 0 11.67185
US Energy/Pop.2 13212 66.62918 46.14584 0 136.2322
Sys. Energy/Pop. 12829 1.388583 0.7335191 0.1209896 2.290689
Sys. Energy/Pop.2 12829 2.466171 1.890983 0.0146385 5.247256
Other Indep. Variables
Major Power 13212 0.0830306 0.2759389 0 1
# States in System 13212 105.9584 58.13557 23 192
# Major Powers 13212 5.824932 1.047652 4 8
‘Colony year’ (Strang) 10300 34.96078 38.14619 0 170
‘Colony years’ (Ravlo et al.) 11115 31.89051 37.06093 0 175
Sources: David Strang, ‘From Dependency to Sovereignty: An Event History Analysis of
Decolonization 1870–1987’, American Sociological Review, 55 (1990), 846–60; Hilde Ravlo,
Nils Petter Gleditsch and Han Dorussen, ‘Colonial War and the Democratic Peace’, Journal of
Conﬂict Resolution, 47 (2003), 520–48.
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than for the dichotomous variable. Still, results are substantially consistent with those in
Table 1. Model 7 reports the curvilinear relationship between development and the count
of colonies. Fighting Technology is again negative and signiﬁcant, while the interaction
term between development and military technology is again positive. The power variable
(Fighting Effectiveness) is positive, though signiﬁcant only in Model 8. The number of
colonies held by the hegemon signiﬁcantly increases colonialism by other states, while
state capabilities or major power status have modest effects. Model 8 substitutes iron and
steel production per capita for energy consumption.117 Regime Type becomes marginally
signiﬁcant in the expected direction for the ﬁrst time. Six of our seven hypotheses are thus
consistently supported. The fact that democracy is usually insigniﬁcant suggests that
while institutionalist arguments are logically tenable, popular rule does not appear to
impact imperialism in practice.
CONCLUSION: ONCE AND FUTURE EMPIRE?
The lust for territory subsided among powerful nations as it became cheaper to make than
to take, and as the global mercantilist system gave way to freer trade. Empire is
unappealing when appropriative technology is low, domestic labour is scarce or when
global markets are obstructed.
In contrast, the desire to control land, rooted labour and minerals remains strong in the
developing world. Poor countries still covet territory, though they often lack the capacity
to project power beyond their borders. In places where labour is cheap and abundant and
capital is expensive, conquest and other activities designed to allow the state to acquire a
larger pool of rents will remain appealing. A ﬁnal factor is American enforcement of a
norm of territorial integrity, though this could decay if the United States weakens or
developing states become more capable of conquest.118
Paradoxically, successful development could increase the number of ‘middle tier’
economies, which could then overwhelm internal or external inhibitions against territorial
aggression. Rapid development could see nations cross the military effectiveness threshold
(r^) faster than the rise in the cost of labour. At the same time, technological innovation
might again increase the ability of the most advanced nations to take rather than make.
Automation and smart weaponry could dramatically lower the cost of empire. Alternatively,
political instability or dramatic price increases in critical resources could spark efforts to
control mineral-rich regions. Global political competition could also ignite efforts to capture
and control scarce minerals. We must hope that rising powers see themselves as beneﬁciaries
of the global economy and endorse open markets in due course.
Finally, what should be made of the revived empire debate? At least some of the
controversy follows from different conceptions of what empire entails. Proponents of
American Exceptionalism seem in fact to be advocating American leadership. To the
degree that our results suggest an important role for the hegemon in promoting open
markets, we can support this limited form of leadership. However, much of the advocacy
117 All models presented in this analysis have been replicated using iron and steel production in place of
the energy consumption variables. In most cases, the iron and steel production variables provide an even
better ﬁt than energy consumption. However, the interaction term between iron and steel production and
military technology is generally not statistically signiﬁcant. All results are available from the authors.
118 Zacher, ‘The Territorial Integrity Norm’; Tanisha Fazal, ‘State Death in the International System’,
International Organization, 58 (2004), 311–44.
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is overblown and confused, precisely because sponsorship of global markets limits the
incentives for powerful states to pursue other aspects of empire. Critics, too, seem to
exaggerate the continuity between recent American policies and earlier incarnations of
territorial empire. There is something different about how the current hegemon treats
territory, but in contrast to George W. Bush, we see this change as applicable to every
nation, not just the United States.
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